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ABSTRACT
Achieving coordination is crucial in organizational control. This pa-
per investigates a middle ground solution between decentralized in-
teractions and centralized administrations for coordinating agents
beyond inefficient behavior. We first propose the price of gover-
nance (PoG) to evaluate how such a middle ground solution per-
forms in terms of effectiveness and cost. We then propose a hierar-
chical supervision framework to explicitly model the PoG, and de-
fine step by step how to realize the core principle of the framework
and compute the optimal PoG for a control problem. Two illustra-
tive case studies are carried out to exemplify the applications of
the proposed framework and its methodology. Results show that by
properly formulating and implementing each step, the hierarchical
supervision framework is capable of promoting coordination among
agents while bounding administrative cost to a minimum in differ-
ent kinds of organizational control problems.
KEYWORDS
Coordination; Hierarchical Control; Multiagent Learning; Social
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1 INTRODUCTION
Imagine a fairy tale that you were the king of an ancient kingdom.
Owning a large piece of land, you were now facing a tricky prob-
lem: how to divide the land into smaller administrative districts such
that you can run your kingdom as efficiently as possible? You might
choose to directly govern each citizen by yourself. While you could
take full control of your kingdom in this way, a heavy burden would
definitely be imposed. Or, you might prefer relieving yourself by let-
ting each district administrate itself. However, as the number (size)
of districts is getting larger (smaller), your kingdom tends to be
more fragmented and thus your authority is prone to be weakened.
Facing this dilemma, you were puzzled: what is the best size for the
partition such that your control is not impaired but at the same time
the whole kingdom can function efficiently?
Although this fairy tale seems naive, it reveals a fundamental
yet challenging issue in organizational control, where centralization
and decentralization are two completely opposite solutions to guar-
antee system performance. Application domains include but are not
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limited to the management of supply chains [11], resource alloca-
tion in cognitive radio networks [15] or multiuser OFDMA net-
works [30], and multi-robot formation/consensus control [20, 32].
In these domains, it is crucial to design efficient coordination mech-
anisms that enable all the agents to reach an agreement in areas of
common interest. While centralized mechanisms often rely on a dic-
tatorial authority to formulate, specify and enforce how the agents
should coordinate with each other, decentralized mechanisms en-
able agents to coordinate via local interactions and without relying
on any centralized authority.
On one hand, it is generally believed that system performance
could be improved upon given dictatorial control over agents’ ac-
tions. Imposing such control, however, can be costly or even infea-
sible in large systems due to the expense of high administrative cost.
Moreover, as the environments where agents reside in become even
more dynamic and open, continuously monitoring and governing
each agent’s behavior will soon become intractable. On the other
hand, pure decentralized mechanisms usually cannot guarantee sat-
isfactory performance if no external interventions or explicit mech-
anisms are imposed. As in the social dilemma scenarios, for exam-
ple, pure rational behavior based on best-response reinforcement
learning will end up with non-cooperative defection, also known
as selfish equilibria, which is suboptimal with respect to the so-
cial welfare [4]. In coordination games, high level of coordination
among distributed learning agents are rarely achieved if no extra
mechanisms are introduced, especially in situations with stochastic
and partial information [16]. Similar results can also be observed
in various kinds of congestion games, such as resource allocation
problems, in which inductive reasoning or regret-based learning al-
gorithms would always converge to an inefficient equilibrium that
is far worse than the optimum [19].
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of a middle ground
solution between decentralized interactions and centralized admin-
istrations, by which self-interested agents can utilize a proper level
of coordination to improve their performance beyond inefficient
equilibria or uncoordinated behavior. Based on the two quantitative
criteria of price of anarchy (PoA) and price of monarchy (PoM),
we propose the price of governance (PoG) to evaluate how such
a middle ground solution performs in terms of effectiveness and
cost. The PoA measures the inefficiency of a decentralized solution
with respect to the natural objective function, and can be defined
as the ratio of the objective function value of a decentralized solu-
tion at its convergence to that of an optimum achieved by a fully
centralized solution. Corresponding to the PoA, PoM is defined as
the practical cost of centralized administration. By combining these
two criteria into an overall value of PoG using a combination func-
tion, an optimal middle ground solution can be properly discovered
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to make the best trade-off between inefficiency/cheapness of decen-
tralization and optimality/high cost of centralization.
Motivated to explicitly model PoG and seek its optimal value, we
then introduce a hierarchical supervision framework, which nicely
reflects the features of organizational structure and hierarchical gov-
ernance in human societies. We define step by step how to realize
the core principle of hierarchical supervision in the framework and
compute the optimal PoG for a control problem. We then carry out
a preliminary set of simulations in two case studies: the norm learn-
ing (NL) problem [9] and multi-agent resource selection (MARS)
problem [19], to evaluate the efficacy of our framework. The two
chosen cases are typical coordination problems that have been widely
and extensively studied before. The existence of sub-norm in the
NL problem and the rationality paradox in the MARS problem are
both famous puzzles that have challenged researchers for decades.
Results show that the hierarchical supervision framework can facil-
itate coordination among agents (i.e., reducing the PoA) compared
to a pure decentralized solution. At the same time, an optimal PoG
can be achieved to bring out the maximum coordination promotion
while bounding the PoM significantly lower than that of a centrally
administrated system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces PoG and the proposed supervision learning framework.
Section 3 presents two case studies. Section 4 discusses related
work. Finally, Section 5 concludes this chapter.
2 SEEKING THE OPTIMAL POG
In this section, we formally define the concept of PoG, which is a
measure of a middle ground solution between centralized control
and decentralized interactions. We then introduce the hierarchical
supervision framework and formulate step-by-step implementation
of seeking the optimal PoG for a coordination problem.
2.1 The Price of Governance
In order to measure the degradation of social welfare due to selfish
behavior of players, the price of anarchy (PoA) was introduced in
[17] for makespan minimization in scheduling games. In its original
form, PoA was defined as the worst-case ratio between the value of
social cost in a Nash equilibrium and that of some social optimum.
Along this definition, researchers have done extensive investigation
on the theoretical bound analysis of PoA under various conditions
of games [21, 29], and applied the PoA concept in a variety of real-
world domains, including routing in transportation, resource alloca-
tion of network bandwidths, communication network design, com-
petitive dynamic pricing, and supply chain management [7].
Game theoretical analysis of PoA has deepened our understand-
ing of the impact of selfish behavior on system performance. To
expand the realm of its applications, PoA has also been generalized
to many other contexts, such as for defining the inefficiency of a
multiagent learning algorithm in resource allocation problems [19],
and more broadly the inefficiency of decentralization [8, 31]. Fol-
lowing this, we define PoA as the ratio of social cost at an equilib-
rium (convergence) to the optimal social cost that could possibly
be achieved by a centralized optimization approach. More formally,
Price of Anarchy (PoA) can be given by:
PoA =
ψopt −ψdis
ψopt
, PoA ∈ [0, 1] (1)
where ψopt is the optimal performance using a centralized solution
andψdis is the performance of a decentralized solution. The perfor-
mance can be any criterion that evaluates a solution, e.g., coordi-
nation level or convergence speed. A lower PoA indicates a more
effective decentralized solution.
Analogous to the price of anarchy, we can define the price of
monarchy as the practical cost of maintaining centralization in a
system. To simplify illustration, we mainly discuss managerial cost
in terms of communication cost. Thus, the lower bound of the price
of monarchy is found in a fully decentralized non-communicating
system, and the upper bound of the price of monarchy is found in
a fully centralized system. Let φdis and φopt denote a communi-
cation cost function of a decentralized solution and a centralized
solution, respectively. Price of Monarchy (PoM) is given by:
PoM =
φdis
φopt
, PoM ∈ [0, 1] (2)
For a target problem and a given coordination solution, PoA
and PoM can be calculated in a closed form or estimated using
specific modelling and simulation techniques. The Price of Gover-
nance (PoG) then can be computed using a combination function Γ
of PoA and PoM:
PoG = Γ(PoA, PoM) (3)
By defining different function Γ, one can capture various patterns
of behavior towards totalitarianism or liberalism, depending on spe-
cific purpose of solving a target problem.
2.2 The Hierarchical Supervision Framework
Inspired to model PoG and seek its optimal value, we then introduce
the hierarchical supervision framework, which is composed of the
following five steps.
Step 1: Segmentation of social groups. To model hierarchical
supervision and organizational governance in human societies, a so-
cial group is first divided into a set of subgroups according to some
predefined methods. Interactions of sub-group members are purely
local and decentralized, and may be constrained by certain exter-
nal factors such as network topologies or social relationships. In
each sub-group, a superior governor monitors and administrates the
behavior of its subordinates. The governor can be any one of the
subordinate agents in the sub-group or another dedicated agent. A
governor can also interact with another governor or other governors
to exchange their information or learn from each other using social
learning strategies.
Step 2:Aggregation of public opinions. In each sub-group, agents
make decisions in a fully decentralized manner. Agents may
• learn from the outcome of interaction with another randomly
chosen member using reinforcement learning;
• copy another member’s behavior using some imitation rules;
• simply make decisions independently.
Each agent then reports its decision to its governor, who then ag-
gregates all the information from its subordinates to form a public
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opinion using democratic mechanisms. This public opinion sum-
marizes the overall attitude towards the members’ behavior in the
governor’s group.
Step 3: Generation of supervision policies. After obtaining the
public opinion, each governor then generates a supervision policy
by exchanging its information with another governor and learning
from situations in other subgroups. The generated supervision pol-
icy is deemed as the most successful behavior in the whole soci-
ety, and can be in different forms such as being the majority action
adopted by the members, the highest rewarded action or their com-
binations.
Step 4: Adaption of local behavior. The supervision policy is
then passed down to the group members by the governor in order
to entrench its influence in the group. According to the targeted
problem, this integration process can be conducted in distinct man-
ners. The supervision policy can be used to dictate the policy for
group members directly, or as a suggestive guide to adapt mem-
bers’ behavior through modifying their behaviorial parameters (e.g.,
learning speed or exploration mode), transforming the environmen-
tal components (e.g., states or rewards), or changing the way how
members interact with each other (e.g., to whom to interact).
Step 5: Calculation of the optimal PoG. PoA can be computed
as the ratio of the performance value at convergence to the optimal
performance value using a centralized solution that a single gover-
nor supervises the whole group. PoM can be computed as the prac-
tical communication cost of maintaining centralization in the group.
The communication cost can be in different forms such as the num-
ber of message exchange or the geometrical distance between group
members and the governor. Then, PoG can be calculated using a
predefined combination function Γ.
As the number or size of subgroups indicates different levels of
centralization and thus different PoG1, the whole problem is then
reduced to seeking the optimal size of subgroups in which case the
minimal PoG can be achieved. Let p ∈ P be a partition of the group.
The problem is now transformed into the following optimization
problem:
min
p ∈P
PoG = Γ(PoA, PoM)
s .t . kp (PoA, PoM) = 0, ∀p ∈ P (4)
where k is the PoA and PoM relationship function that is deter-
mined by the target problem and the chosen coordination solution.
The constraints in Eq. (4) means that for each partition of the group,
its PoA and PoM value should satisfy their relationship function.
For a problem that PoA, PoM and their relationship function can
be computed in a closed form, general optimization methods can be
applied to compute the solution of this optimization problem. The
other more straightforward way is to sample in the partition space
in different levels of granularity, and then apply simple approxima-
tion methods to estimate the relationship between PoA and PoM.
The optimal PoG then can be easily derived by solving the combi-
natorial equations of relationship function k and PoG function Γ.
1More subgroups means smaller size of each subgroup, and thus the whole group is
more decentralized. In the extreme case when subgroup size is 1, each agent governs
its own behavior and this indicates a fully decentralized case.
3 TWO CASE STUDIES
This section provides two case studies to illustrate the applications
of the proposed framework and its methodology. We show that by
properly formulating and implementing each step, the hierarchical
supervision framework is capable of promoting coordination while
bounding administrative cost to a minimum in different kinds of
organizational control problems.
3.1 The Norm Learning Problem
Social norm is an important concept in multiagent systems to fa-
cilitate coordination among agents by posing constraints on agents’
behavior [23]. The norm learning (NL) problem deals with how a
social norm can be established in a bottom-up manner via agents’
local learning interactions. This problem has attracted a great inter-
est in recent years and extensive investigations have been conducted
under various assumptions about agent interaction protocols, soci-
etal topologies, and observation capabilities [1, 12, 13, 25, 28].
3.1.1 Problem Description. Considering a typical setting of
network topology, a group of agents are organized in a social net-
work and each agent can only interact with its neighbors, using ei-
ther reinforcement learning approaches or some predefined imita-
tion rules. The interactions between two agents can be modeled as
a pure Coordination Game (CG) [22], in which the agents are re-
warded positively when their actions are consistent and penalized
otherwise. The goal is to enable all the agents to reach an agree-
ment (social norm) in the whole system. Although this problem
seems simple, successfully solving it is a challenging task due to
the widely recognized existence of sub-norms, which prevents the
full convergence of a consistent social norm in the whole group
[18].
3.1.2 Application of the Methodology. We now provide an
illustration of how to apply the proposed methodology in solving
NL problem in a structured system where agents interact with each
other using basic reinforcement learning approach, particularly Q-
learning algorithm.
Step 1: Group segmentation. We use an R ∗ R grid network by
default, and separate it into n ∗ n (1 ≤ n ≤ R) subgroups2 , each
of which is denoted as Cx . We imagine a governor located in the
geometrical center of each subgroup.
Step 2: Aggregation of public opinion. At time step t , in each
subgroup Cx , agent i chooses an action ai with the highest Q-value
or randomly chooses an action with an exploration probability ϵti .
Agent i then interacts with a random neighbor j and receives a
payoff ri . The learning experience in terms of action-reward pair
(ai , ri ) is reported to agent i’s governor x, and the governor ag-
gregates all the information from its subordinates into two values
Fx and Rx . Value Fx (a) indicates the overall acceptance (i.e., fre-
quency) of action a in subgroup Cx and value Rx (a) indicates the
overall reward of action a inCx . Fx (a) can be calculated as Fx (a) =∑
i ∈Cx
δ (a,ai ), where δ (a,ai ) is the Kronecker delta function, which
equals to 1 if a = ai , and 0 otherwise. Rx (a) can be calculated by
Rx (a) = 1Fx (a)
∑
i ∈Cx ,ai=a
ri . Especially, Rx (a) is set to 0 if Fx (a) = 0.
2In case of n being not divisible by R, the remaining agents on the border are included
in a single subgroup.
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Each governor x then combines the actions of each subgroup into
a public opinion ox using democratic voting mechanism (ox =
arд maxa Fx (a)), which means that ox is simply the action most
accepted by the subgroup.
Step 3: Generation of supervision policies. After generating the
public opinion, each governor then generates a supervision policy
ax , which indicates the social norm, i.e., the most successful behav-
ior, in the neighborhood. To this end, the governor resorts to social
learning with another governor by changing their information and
comparing the performance of their public opinions. Many social
learning strategies can be applied for this purpose, and we here em-
ploy the widely used imitation rules from the evolutionary game
theory (EGT) [24], given by px→y = 1
1+e−β (uy−ux )
, where px→y
is a probability for governor x to imitate the action of neighboring
governor y, ux = Rx (ox ) is the fitness of the public opinion of gov-
ernor x, uy = Ry (oy ) is the fitness of neighboring governor y, and
β > 0 is a parameter to control selection bias.
Step 4: Adaption of local behavior. Each agent i in a subgroup
adjusts its learning behavior in order to comply with the generated
supervision policy from its governor. By comparing its action ati
with the supervision policy ax , agent i can evaluate whether it is
performing well or not so that its learning behavior can be dynami-
cally adapted to fit the supervision policy. Learning rate and explo-
ration rate are two fundamental tuning parameters in RL. Heuristic
adaption of these two parameters thus models the adaptive learning
behavior of agents. More specifically, when agent i has chosen the
same action with the supervision policy (i.e., ati = ax ), it decreases
its learning rate to maintain its current state (αt+1i = (1 − λ)αti ),
otherwise, it increases its learning rate to learn faster from its in-
teraction experience (αt+1i = (1 − αti )λ + λ), where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a
parameter to control the adaption rate. The exploration rate can be
updated likewise. Finally, agent i updates its Q-value using the new
learning rate αt+1i and/or exploration rate ϵ
t+1
i . The proposed mech-
anisms are based on the concept of “winning” and “losing” in the
well-known multi-agent learning algorithm WoLF (Win-or-Learn-
Fast) [5]. While the original meaning of “winning” or “losing” in
WoLF and its variants is to indicate whether an agent is doing better
or worse than its Nash-Equilibrium policy, this heuristic is grace-
fully borrowed here to evaluate the agent’s performance against the
supervision policy.
Step 5: Calculation of optimal PoG. We sample the size of sub-
group from n = 1 to n = R and derive PoA and PoM for each
size of subgroup through simulations. The PoA indicates the ratio
of performance loss at an equilibrium (convergence) to the optimal
performance that could possibly be achieved by a centralized opti-
mization approach. In the NL problem, the performance loss can
be reflected by the consensus level of the whole group, i.e., the
proportion of agents in the whole system that have not achieved a
consensus. Thus, PoA can be computed as the proportion of agents
with sub-norms in the system. As for the PoM, the geometric dis-
tance between a group agent and its governor is used to represent
the communication cost3. For each case of subgroup size, the PoA
and PoM pair can be obtained accordingly. Function approximation
3In terms of number of messages exchanged, decentralized and centralized solutions
may have almost the same number of messages to be exchanged. However, central-
ized solutions can bring about higher level of jam since agents are utilizing the same
common channel [19]
methods then can be applied to fit all the pairs to derive the relation-
ship function k between PoA and PoM. Finally, given a predefined
PoG function Γ, the optimal PoG value and its associated subgroup
size can be found accordingly.
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Figure 1: The left part plots the dynamics of PoA in terms of av-
erage reward using different learning approaches. HL-α , HL-ϵ,
and HL-α · ϵ denote, respectively, the three approaches under
the proposed hierarchical supervision framework when agents
adapt their learning rate α , exploration rate ϵ, and both rates at
the same time. The other three approaches represent the IL ap-
proaches with a decaying α , a decaying ϵ or a fixed α and ϵ. The
right part shows the evolution dynamics of agents’ actions and
learning rate. Subfigures (a)-(d) give the snapshots of action dis-
tribution in the group and (e)-(h) present the snapshot of values
of learning rate α at step t = 0, 10, 50, 1000, respectively.
3.1.3 Experiments and Results. First, we would like to test
whether the proposed hierarchical supervision framework is capa-
ble of facilitating coordination among agents (i.e., reducing the PoA),
compared on a pure decentralized learning approach. We conduct
the investigation on a 10 ∗ 10 grid network, which is separated
into several 4 ∗ 4 clusters (the remaining 2 agents on the border
are included in a single group). We consider stateless version of
Q-learning, and each agent can choose from 4 actions as default.
Parameters α and ϵ are initially set to 0.1 and 0.01, respectively.
Moreover, parameter β and γ are both set to 0.1. The final results
are averaged over 1000 independent runs. We compare our hierar-
chical learning approaches (denoted as HL) to the individual learn-
ing (IL) approach, which is a fully decentralized approach in that
agents learn randomly with another agent in the population and up-
date their strategies independently.
The left part of Figure 1 shows that the coordination ratio of
the whole group using different approaches increases as learning
proceeds, but the hierarchical learning approaches (especially HL-ϵ
and HL-α ·ϵ) can reach a higher convergence level than the individ-
ual learning approaches. This result indicates that by introducing a
certain level of centralized control, the PoA can be greatly reduced.
As shown from subfigures (a)-(d), the four actions are equally dis-
tributed in the population at first (a), but as time proceeds, the action
represented by blue color emerges as the dominating social norm in
the whole population (d).
In order to reveal the behavior dynamics under the proposed
framework, subfigures (e)-(h) in Figure 1 present the snapshot of
values of learning rate α during learning. The values are set to be
0.1 initially (e) and then increase to higher values (f). As time pro-
ceeds, the values decrease gradually (g) and finally reach zero (h).
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Figure 2: Dynamics of ϵ and α in case of (a) 2 actions and (b) 4
actions. Dynamics of α and ϵ with HL-α · ϵ overlap with each
other because of the identical update method.
At the beginning, failed interactions among agents drive agents to
learn fast to escape from this adverse situation. As learning moves
on, agents’ actions are more and more consistent with the supervi-
sion policy, and thus α decreases accordingly. Figure 2 further plots
the learning dynamics with different action sizes. In a 4-action sce-
nario, the values change more drastically at first and then take a
longer time to decrease to zero. This is because the probability to
find the right action as the norm is greatly reduced when the number
of actions gets larger, and thus the coordination process is greatly
hindered.
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Figure 3: The relationship of PoA and PoM, and the calculation
of the optimal PoG in the NL problem. The relationship func-
tion between PoA and PoM is fitted using curve f (x) = a(x+b ) +c,
with the fitted coefficient a, b, c being 0.0174, 0.0299, 0.0821, re-
spectively.
Figure 3 plots the relationship between PoM and PoA when the
subgroup size takes different values of n in a 30 × 30 grid network.
As we can see, a larger size can result in a higher consensus level
(i.e., lower PoA). This is easy to understand because each governor
can have a more powerful control force over the group compara-
tively when the subgroup size is larger. The communication cost,
however, also increases as the subgroup size becomes larger, caus-
ing a higher PoM. It is obvious that the PoA and PoM are two
contradictory criteria that evaluate the coordination performance.
PoA indicates the consensus level while PoM indicates the cost for
achieving this performance. Higher PoM indicates a more central-
ized system (i.e., higher cost) and thus a better coordination perfor-
mance (i.e., lower PoA) can be achieved. We can observe that the
PoA and PoM exhibit a monotonous relationship with a long tail
phenomenon. This indicates that the PoA can be reduced signifi-
cantly by only introducing a bit of centralized control, e.g., when
subgroup size is from 2 to 8. This improvement, however, is only
at the expense of very low communication cost, as reflected by the
low value of PoM. As an illustration to compute the lowest PoG, we
simplify the PoG function as PoG =
√
PoA2 + PoM2. The optimal
PoG is then on the tangent point between the curve of PoG function
and the relationship function. In the case of 30× 30 grid network as
shown in Figure 3, the optimal PoG can be achieved when the grid
is divided into several 7 × 7 clusters, which means that the whole
group will achieve the maximum coordination promotion at the ex-
pense of lowest administration cost.
3.2 The MARS Problem
The multi-agent resource selection problem (MARS) is a class of
congestion games characterized by a large number of self-interested
agents competing for common resources [19]. This so called con-
gestion effect is apparent in many real-world situations, ranging
from traffic routing in transportation systems, bandwidth allocation
in communication networks, to other versions of tragedy of the com-
mons that are characterized by negative externalities.
3.2.1 Problem Description. Formally, anMARS problem can
be defined as a quadruple of (N ,Θ,A,R), in which N = 1, 2, ...,n is
a set of agents, Θ = r1, ..., rm denotes a set of resources available
for agents inN ,At = a1×...×an denotes the resource choices of the
agents at time t where ai ∈ Θ, ∀i ∈ N , and Rt : Θ×At →ℜ is a re-
ward function. In MARS, a reward associated with using a resource
is defined as a function of the number of concurrent users of the re-
source, and all users using the same resource share the same reward.
So, agents’ valuations of congested resources are not exogenously-
determined, but rather are endogenous functions of one each other’s
actions.
The El Farol bar problem (EFBP) is a simple example of MARS,
which was introduced in [3]. In EFBP, a set of n agents repeatedly
make decisions of whether to attend a bar or not on certain nights.
The only observations available to the agents are the past history of
attendance at the bar. The bar is a congested resource so that the pay-
off of attending a bar is high only if the number of attendees at the
bar on the night is less than a certain threshold ζ . The agents receive
the worst payoff if the bar is over crowded. Thus, an agent needs to
reason about the attendance so as to decide whether to attend it or
not. However, a rational agent always fails to learn the best decision
based on its expected reward, since all agents are simultaneously
learning the same information and reason in the same manner. This
leads to the rationality paradox in general MARS problems.
3.2.2 Application of the Methodology. In the bar problem,
we apply the methodology of our hierarchical supervision frame-
work in the following five steps.
Step 1: Group segmentation. We imagine 900 people living in
a district with 30*30 blocks, which can be separated into several
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subgroups with n ∗ n blocks. The different values of n thus indicate
different levels of centralized governance.
Step 2: Aggregation of public opinion. Each member i has a
probability of pi to attend the bar. A community governor in each
subgroup collects the information of how many subordinates went
to the bar last night (i.e., attendance radio in the subgroup) and the
average reward of subordinates in the subgroup4 . The attendance
radio in the subgroup is the public opinion and the average reward
is its performance
Step 3: Generation of supervision policies. Based on the pub-
lic opinion from the subgroup in terms of attendance radio and its
reward, the governor applies reinforcement learning to update her
knowledge about whether to attend the bar or not. To apply the tab-
ular form of Q-learning, we transform the attendance radio between
[0, 1] into a set of discrete actions. Moreover, the governors need to
learn from other governors by comparing their performance. Sim-
ple imitation rule (e.g., the Fermi rule) can be employed for this
purpose. If the governor accepts the action of another governor in
the social learning process, she informs the new action to her subor-
dinates as the subversion policy, otherwise, the governor chooses an
action based on the Q values using ε exploration strategy (i.e., with
a high provability of 1 − ε to choose the action with the highest Q
value and a small provability of ε to explore randomly), and informs
her subordinates the chosen action accordingly.
Step 4: Adaption of local behavior. When receiving the super-
vision policy in terms of attendance probability ai , a subordinate
agent i updates its policy of attendance probability pi directly by
pi = (1−µ)∗pi +µ ∗ai , where µ is a learning rate. In the next round,
agent i decides whether to attend the bar based on the updated at-
tendance probability.
Step 5: Calculation of optimal PoG. We normalize the PoA by
PoAn = 1 − rn−rminrmax−rmin , where rn is the average reward of group
size n, rmin and rmax are the minimum and maximum average re-
ward for different sizes of subgroups, respectively. The calculation
of PoM is: PoMn =
cn−cmin
cmax−cmin , where cn is the communication
cost of group size n, cmin and cmax are the minimum and maxi-
mum communication cost for different sizes of subgroups, respec-
tively. The geometric distance is still used to represent the commu-
nication cost. The relationship function between PoA and PoM, as
well as the optimal size and PoG value then can be derived in the
same way as in the NL problem.
3.3 Experiment Results
We set the threshold of attendance ζ to 540, which means that the
bar can only accommodate 60% of total 900 agents at most. If more
than 540 agents attend the bar, they will receive a penalized reward
to indicate a crowded situation. The learning parameter µ is set to
0.1. In Q-learning, the range of attendance probability in between
[0, 1] is divided into 50 discrete actions, with the interval between
two adjacent action being probability of 0.02. Exploration rate ε
is set to 0.01. In each trial, the experiment runs for 1000 nights
(i.e., time steps), and we take the average of rewards in the last
100 time steps for evaluation. As a benchmark, agents maintain the
probability of attendance, and update the policy by learning with an
4Actually, more sophisticated methods can be applied here by reasoning on a longer
past history of attendance.
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Figure 4: The dynamics of attendance in the bar problem. In
the benchmark case, agents make their decisions without any
hierarchial control. In the hierarchical supervision case, n indi-
cates the size of subgroups in the 30*30 group.
arbitrary agent in the system using the imitation rule. The results
are averaged over 1000 trials.
From Figure 4, it is clear that the number of participants in the
benchmark model is fluctuating along the threshold, indicating an
inefficient equilibrium among agents. When an agent predicts the
attendance at the bar is lower than ζ , then the agent decides to attend
the bar. Since the other agents also reason in the same manner, the
entire population decides to attend the bar, ending up with the worst
payoffs. Therefore, agents face contradicting outcomes by making
decisions based on their rationality. This rationality paradox can
be greatly alleviated using the proposed framework by imposing a
certain level of centralized control on the agents. As can be seen, the
number of overcrowded nights is significantly reduced when n = 10.
The performance is further promoted when the governor has a wider
control range when n = 30 in a fully centralized manner.
The left part in Figure 5 presents the relationship curve when the
30*30 group is divided to different sizes of subgroups. It shows the
same pattern of result as the NL problem, and the optimal value of
PoG can be computed in the same way as described before. The
right part in Figure 5 presents the impact of different sizes of agent
population. It is apparent that a higher population size R generates
a lower optimal PoG. This is an interesting phenomenon that is a
bit of counterintuitive. It demonstrates that the proposed methodol-
ogy is more suitable for larger systems, where decentralized control
methods cannot perform well because of the narrow vision of agents
and lack of centralized control. This also provides an explanation on
why in real-life situations, large organizations and systems such as
countries and companies usually embody the feature of hierarchical
supervision structures to make an elegant balance between central-
ized governance and decentralized administration.
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Figure 5: The relationship of PoA and PoM in the bar problem
in the case of 30*30 group (the left part), and the relationship of
PoA and PoM in different sizes of agent groups (the right part)
4 RELATEDWORK
PoA has been extensively studied in the area of computational eco-
nomics and computer science to study the inefficiency of selfish
behavior [2, 17]. The mainstream research in this direction focuses
on the computational analysis of upper or lower bound on PoA un-
der various conditions of congestion games and real-world applica-
tions. Wang et al. analyzed PoA in the sequential repeated conges-
tion games [29]. Feldman et al. developed an analytical framework
for bounding PoA in fundamental classes of games when there is
a large number of players [10]. The PoA has also been analyzed in
decentralized transportation networks [31] and price mechanisms
for network resource allocation [7]. However, most of these studies
do not consider an explicit cost associated with the decision mak-
ing process, which is unrealistic in real-life problems where man-
ageable cost or communication cost is inevitable in sustaining the
global system order. While the work in [19] has extended the defi-
nition of PoA as a measure of inefficiency of a multiagent learning
algorithm in MARS problems, and considered adminstration cost
in such contexts, our work highlights a general hierarchical super-
vision framework to explicitly model and trade off PoA and its as-
sociated cost.
The principle of hierarchical supervision in organizations has
been widely adopted in previous studies. For example, Zhang et
al. developed an organization-based control framework to speed up
multiagent learning in a network of agents [33, 34]. Bazzan et al.
resorted to the hierarchical supervision as a social instrument for
solving the prisoner’s dilemma [4]. In this work, we propose the
methodology to realize general hierarchical supervision in organi-
zations and focus on seeking the optimal control solution to trading
off between cost and performance in such organizations.
There is also tremendous amount of work that aims to solve co-
ordination issues in the two case problems. For the NL problem,
numerous mechanisms have been proposed for efficient emergence
of social norms while agents interact with each other using learn-
ing (particularly reinforcement learning) methods. These mecha-
nisms include the social learning strategy [1, 6, 22], the collective
interaction protocol [12, 32], the utilization of topological knowl-
edge [14, 25, 27] and agents’ observation capabilities [26, 28]. Var-
ious kinds of solutions have also been proposed to solve the selfish
equilibria problem in MARS, or more broadly, social dilemmas,
when agents use rational learning strategies for interaction. For ex-
ample, Bazzan et al. resorted to social instruments of hierarchy and
coalition to promote cooperation in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas
[4]. Oh and Smith applied social learning to promote the social wel-
fare in MARS problems [19]. Our work supplements the literature
by providing new effective solutions to these two challenging prob-
lems. This is also claimed as the main contribution of this paper.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we argue for the benefits of considering both cen-
tralized control and decentralized interactions in solving a coordi-
nation problem. By trading off between these two aspects, an op-
timal middle ground solution, represented by the lowest PoG, can
be discovered. Two explicit case studies are presented to exemplify
the implementation of the hierarchical supervision framework: the
NL problem is a pure coordination game where agents’ behavior
should keep consistently such that a global social norm can be es-
tablished, while the MARS problem is a typical social dilemma
problem where agents should reason in a bounded rational manner
to avoid tragedy of the commons. Simulation results show that the
proposed framework is capable of promoting coordination among
agents while bounding the administrative cost to a minimum value.
As such, the hierarchical supervision framework and its implemen-
tation methodology are indeed effective mechanisms towards coor-
dination in organizational control.
The work in this paper inspires several directions for future work.
First, in this paper we implement the framework using simulations,
that is, sampling methods are used to fit the PoA and PoM relation-
ship curve before computing the lowest PoG. This proof-of-concept
validation is reasonable for the two case problems, particularly for
the NL problem where theoretical analysis and proof over the solu-
tion and its performance are still open issues in this area. However,
building on the rich work in theoretical analysis on PoA [21, 29],
it is possible to derive the optimal PoG in a closed form by intro-
ducing a cost function into the problem formulation and solving
the optimization problem given by Eq. (4) directly. Second, richer
phenomenon or more important discoveries may be revealed under
various problem settings or specifications, e.g., combination func-
tions, or cost measurement etc. Last, we are expecting more imple-
mentations of this framework and its methodology in solving other
real-world coordination problems, in which efficiency and cost are
the two main optimized objectives (e.g., resources allocation in cog-
nitive radio networks). These issues are left for the future work.
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